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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we explore three scenarios for the future of the European Union, using history and 
reasoned imagination as guides. Our three scenarios are rooted in European contemporary 
challenges but draw on three ages that have shaped what Europe has become. Scenario 1 harks back 
to Antiquity (“the Empty Empire”), scenario 2 to the Middle Age (“Return of the City-states”) and 
scenario 3 to the Renaissance (“Renascent Europe”). 
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Europe 30 years ago 
 
30 years ago, Europe was almost another continent. The Berlin Wall divided peoples and minds, 
communism was both a shame and a threat. The social context was very unlike ours, with women 
only starting to enter the labour market in great numbers. The technological landscape bore little 
resemblance with today’s: the Internet did not exist, neither did mobile phones, and there were very 
few personal computers. The European political project also looked very different: the EEC had 
nine members, the single market did not yet exist, the European Parliament members were for the 
first time being elected by universal suffrage and there was no single currency. Even so, certain 
similarities come to mind: thirty years ago, Europe was in the midst of a serious economic crisis 
(though it was not global and marked by stagflation) and submitted to important shocks on 
commodities markets. The major difference was economic growth and, most of all, the hope of 
social progress. 
 
What does the future hold for Europe? The European Union is sometimes portrayed as the “old 
lady” of globalisation. In truth, founded in 1992, it stands as the youngest country in the world (not 
counting countries from the former Yugoslavia). Its destiny is thus by no means pre-ordained, but is 
in fact largely undetermined and uncertain.   
 
What do we know for certain about Europe over the next 30 years? It will be affected by the 
stabilization and ageing of its population (like most developed countries and emerging nations: see 
chart 1 and 2) and by the adverse effects of climate change (box 1). A few years older, a few fractions 
of degrees warmer (hopefully): that’s certainly important (all the more than older people are more 
vulnerable to climate change) but that is not much to go on when it comes to making forecasts.  
 
 
 
Chart 1. Population growth rate (%), medium variant 
‐0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
1975‐
1980
1980‐
1985
1985‐
1990
1990‐
1995
1995‐
2000
2000‐
2005
2005‐
2010
2010‐
2015
2015‐
2020
2020‐
2025
2025‐
2030
2030‐
2035
2035‐
2040
China US Europe
 
 
Chart 2. Population aged 65+, medium variant 
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Source: United Nations Division Population. 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Climate change in Europe 
 
 
The average temperature has increased 1.3oC and 1.0oC for the European land area and European land & 
ocean area, respectively, comparing the trend towards 2008 with pre-industrial times. As such Europe has 
warmed slightly more than the global average (i.e. 0.9oC and 0.7oC for land and land & ocean). Considering 
the European land, nine of the 12 years between 1997 and 2008 were among the warmest years since 1850 in 
Europe with 2007 as warmest year (1.5oC higher than pre-industrial), closely followed by 2000, 2006 and 2008.  
 
The annual average temperature for Europe is projected to increase by 1.0-5.5oC (comparing 2080-2100 with 
the 1961-1990 average). This range takes into account the uncertainties in future socio-economic development 
by including two of the IPCC-SRES scenarios (the high emissions A2 and the medium emissions A1b), and 
the uncertainties in the climate models. The warming is projected to be greatest over Eastern Europe, 
Scandinavia and the Arctic in winter (December to February), and over south-western and Mediterranean 
Europe in summer (June to August). The temperature rise in parts of France and the Iberian Peninsula may 
exceed 6oC, while the Arctic could become on average 6oC and possibly 8oC warmer than the 1961-1990 
average. 
 
 
Source: European Environmental Agency. 
 
 
 
 
So our best guides are history and reasoned imagination to figure out Europe’s futures. Our three 
scenarios are thus rooted in contemporary challenges but draw on three ages that have shaped what 
Europe has become. Scenario 1 harks back to Antiquity (“the Empty Empire”), scenario 2 to the 
Middle Age (“Return of the City-states”) and scenario 3 to the Renaissance (“Renascent Europe”). 
 
 
 
First scenario: “The Empty Empire” 
 
 
This scenario is close to what the European project looks like today. In 2009, Europe increasingly 
resembles an “empire of rules” in which political ambition is lacking. The EU does not regard itself 
as a “large” economic or geopolitical power, but presents itself as an empire of democracy reduced 
to human rights and market principles. In this European regime, the power of rules outweighs 
political power.  
 
The paradox at the heart of this scenario is the following: Europe is over-regulated, but under-
governed. The European Union, the world’s leading economic power in 2009, could constitute an 
appropriate level of economic sovereignty within globalisation – the EU is too large to be ignored by 
any business, government or regional bloc in the world – but the historical conditions in which it 
emerged as a political entity and the institutional regime that ensued prevent it from assuming this 
role. National governments – the authorities invested with legitimate powers to take action for the 
future and to react to the unforeseen events of the present – no longer have the proper means of 
doing so. But the authorities possessing the means to act, such as the ECB and the European 
Commission, do not have the legitimacy to use them for political ends. As a result, we are left with a 
situation in which bodies either have legitimacy but not enough means to act or the means to act but 
not enough legitimacy.  
 
Yet, it is hard to ignore that Europe has been a spectacular vector of peace and human rights using a 
peace through trade strategy. The South and the East of Europe have been successfully 
democratized through peaceful market integration (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. The progress of democracy in Europe, 1972-2007 
 
  
  
1972 
  
 2007 
 
  Political rights  
Civil liberties
 
Status 
 
Political rights 
 
Civil liberties 
 
Status 
 
Bulgaria 7 7 Not Free 1 2 Free 
Croatia .. .. .. 2 2 Free 
Czech Republic .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Czechoslovakia 7 7 Not Free .. .. .. 
Germany .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Germany, E.  7 7 Not Free .. .. .. 
Greece 6 6 Not Free 1 2 Free 
Latvia .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Lithuania .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Poland 6 6 Not Free 1 1 Free 
Portugal 5 6 Not Free 1 1 Free 
Romania 7 6 Not Free 2 2 Free 
Serbia & montenegro .. .. .. 3 2 Free 
Slovakia .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Slovenia .. .. .. 1 1 Free 
Spain 5 6 Not Free 1 1 Free 
Source : Freedom House. 
 
What is more, European norms and standards have helped to make the single market the EU’s actual 
foreign policy, foisting the power of European norms upon producers and consumers right around 
the planet. A coherent argument has thus been made in various academic and policy-making circles 
that Europe has in fact invented a new form of power that may prove more efficient than coercion 
or pure force. But this seducing argument misses the important point of the economic cost of non-
political Europe. 
 
Indeed, the existence of a market democracy without politics affects the governance of the economy 
and thus Europe’s growth and development performance. The current state of Europe’s monetary 
Union illustrates how this risk has already materialized. 
 
The European project is officially motivated by the goal of paving the way for a better common 
future for European peoples, but the Stability Pact and the ECB statutes give priority based on 
doctrine-based criteria to “price stability” and “fiscal sustainability”, even if this means reducing 
governments’ ability to deliver “macroeconomic stability” (restricting the length of slowdowns) 
necessary for growth and employment. The intermediate objectives (fiscal balance, currency 
“strength”) are at odds in practice with the attainment of the ultimate objectives (“European public 
goods”), which matter the most to populations.  
 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), especially through the 1990s, has lumbered itself with a 
“dogma-based penalty”, the cost of which has been highest for the largest continental countries, 
which account for three-quarters of the euro zone’s wealth (weaker growth and higher 
unemployment). In the 2000s, tax and social competition within the EU has triggered a “competitive 
social deflation”, which gradually turns EMU into a zero-sum game. Each European nation sees 
itself more and more as a small country, the reference space for which is a globalized environment 
rather than just Europe, and thus enters into institutional competition with its neighbours using its 
social compact. In this system of impoverishing competition, European citizens are the primary 
victims, suffering through a stagnation of GDP per capita, fall in wages, increase in inequalities and 
dismantling of collective protections. 
 
A very simple theoretical framework helps to understand how economic policy plays a crucial role in 
fostering growth. Actual economic growth is the sum of the rate of increase of labor productivity per 
hour and that of the number of hours worked. The latter depends on demographic, social (duration 
of the working week, rate of participation, etc.) and economic factors (the degree of slack in the 
labor market). Beside the demographic prospect, two political dimensions are thus crucial for future 
growth: investment (to increase productivity and potential growth) and macroeconomic management 
(to encourage investment and make actual growth out of potential growth). Those two economic 
policy dimensions of economic growth are precisely lacking in today’s EU, however integrated 
certain markets on the continent might be. And divergence in economic momentum between the 
different regions of the world harbour highly significant implications over the very long term: if a 
growth rate of 2% leads to an eight-fold increase in income over a century, a permanent gap of 1% 
between two regions would lead to the wealth gap quadrupling over the same period (see Chart 3). 
 
 
Chart 3. GDP per capita growth, 1990-2007 (1990 = 100) 
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Source: IMF. 
 
 
 
The problem is particularly acute for the core of the EU, the euro zone, which accounts for 75% of 
the EU’s GDP. Tax and social competition has led to “competitive social deflation” that is 
progressively turning EMU into a zero-sum game (the export market share won by certain countries 
being lost by others). At present, the euro zone presents itself as a collection of small economies 
competing with each other, whereas it should be one large competitive economy fostering cohesion.  
 
The fundamental mechanism of tax competition is predicated on the mobility of tax bases and the 
lack of harmonisation of tax policies. Tax competition is defined as competition between national or 
local governments to attract the tax base into their territory by cutting tax rates. It is 
counterproductive if it becomes an obstacle to fairness and efficiency, i.e. if it hampers the 
satisfaction of present social needs and investments in the future. The principal result of the pressure 
of tax competition between nations, which is, according to KPMG annual survey, the strongest in 
the European Union, has been to skew tax regimes and thus the allocation of resources in favour of 
the most mobile bases – capital income, profits and large asset portfolios – to the detriment of the 
least mobile bases, such as unqualified labour and consumption1. This strategy of competition 
between Member States of the European Union rather than the “outside” pressure of globalisation is 
what has kept the decrease in tax rates going over the past decade.  
 
The fall in corporate and high income taxation has been larger in the European Union than 
anywhere else in the developed world, especially in the United States and Japan (Table 2) and the 
dynamic has even been amplified in the 2000s (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Corporate tax rate, in % 
 Average EU 15* USA Japan 
 
 
effective statutory effective statutory effective statutory 
    
1987 29% 48% 23% 38% 42% 55% 
1997 22% 38% 24% 39% 37% 50% 
2005 21% 32% 24% 39% 28% 40% 
 
Average EU 15 is un-weighted average of France, Germany, UK, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Norway, 
Austria, Sweden. 
Data source: updates database from Devereux, M.P., R. Griffith and A. Klemm (2002) “Corporate income tax 
reforms and international tax competition” Economic Policy, 35: 451-495. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Since the mid-1980s (completion of the Single market), there has been a downtrend in corporate income and 
high income tax rates in Europe and a progressive increase first in labor, and more recently in consumption 
taxation.  
 
 
Table 3. Top statutory income tax rates, % 
 
Tax on personal income Tax on corporate income 
 
2000 2007 2008 Difference 2000-2008 2000 2008 2009 
Difference 
2000-2009
EU27 44,7 39,1 37,8 -6,9 31,9 23,6 23,5 -8,4 
Euro area 48,4 42,1 42,1 -6,3 34,9 26 25,9 -9 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
 
The political risk of the “lowest tax bidder” is high in the medium term. Governments are caught in 
a stranglehold between businesses playing the tax competition game, on the one hand, and the 
households that remain their electoral base, on the other. There is a risk that the divide between 
citizens and their leaders will deepen.  
 
The challenge facing European governments going forward is thus to cooperate to raise taxes on 
capital, but also to transfer their taxation to immobile bases without penalising employment, notably 
on “earth”, the oldest production factor now referring to natural resources and pollutions. 
 
 
If those worrying trends of an ever looser Union were to be prolonged, the scenario of the “Empty 
Empire” would lead to major democratic disruptions through social disintegration. Certain aspects of 
this catastrophic scenario are already in place: over the past thirty years, GDP growth per capita has 
become gradually stagnant, income inequalities have become larger (chart 4) and the labour income 
share has declined (table 4).  
 
 
Chart 4. Cumulative change Mid-1980s to Mid-2000s in Gini coefficient for disposable income 
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Data source: OECD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Labour income share in the EU-15 Member States, Japan and the US 
 
 Max 
  
Year Min           Year 
 
Belgium  66,9  1981  55,2  1961  
Denmark  62,9  1975  56,3  2005  
Germany  66,1  1974  55,9  2006  
Greece  91,9  1960  57  2003  
Spain  67,9  1976  54,5  2006  
France  66,9  1981  56,7  1998  
Ireland  71,2  1975  47,1  2002  
Italy  69,7  1975  53,3  2000  
Luxembourg  62,2  1977  46,4  1969  
Netherlands  70,4  1975  56,7  2006  
Austria  72,9  1978  55,8  2006  
Portugal  87,9  1975  59,6  1969  
Finland  70,3  1966  53,7  2000  
Sweden  69,2  1977  55,4  1995  
United Kingdom  72,2  1975  61,8  1997  
EU-15  69,9  1975  57,8  2006  
Japan  76,4  1975  60,2  2006  
United States  65,9  1970  60,9  2005  
Source: European Commission. 
 
 
There is no automatic factor that will slow down this trend, on the contrary, given the extension of 
the global labour market, but one has to keep in mind that the problem is first European (and not 
global) and second political (and not “natural”). The trend in labour income share in Europe for 
instance indicates two sequences. The first is parallel to the gradual completion of the Single Market 
between the beginning of the 1980s and its partial realisation in 1993. The second period marks the 
full integration of emerging markets as part of globalisation from the 1990s onwards. The trend in 
the proportion of GDP accounted for by wages shows that the first factor, i.e. the early construction 
of Europe, was more significant than the second in the lowering of the labour income share. 
 
This scenario may in the end be accompanied by the worsening in the EU of the structural 
environmental problems that will arise over the next 30 years, the costs of which will depend on the 
degree of democracy in the societies that will have to deal with them. The impact of climate change 
will be greatest in a Europe resembling an “Empty Empire”. 
 
In all, if the EU follows the “empty empire” path, it will become hollow and diluted in globalization.  
 
 
 
 
 
Second scenario: the “return of City States” 
 
Our second scenario is not exclusive of the first, but it pictures the interplay of political and 
economic dynamic differently, focusing not on the dis-aggregation of national social compacts within 
the European empire, but on the rebuilding of local sovereignties within nations thanks to 
agglomeration and concentration forces. The reference here is the late Middle-Age where political 
fragmentation paralleled economic integration and where large unified kingdoms were the exceptions 
and city-states the rule (map 1).  
 
 
Map 1. Unified kingdoms and City-states in 1500’s Europe 
 
 
Source: Euratlas. 
 
 
 
 
“Europeanization” has actually led, since the mid-19th century, to a new concentration of wealth in 
cities (population, technology, qualified labour, services, amenities), and these agglomeration effects 
have been accelerated by the achievement of the Single Market in the late 1980s. Growth has thus 
been polarised in large metropolises with global influence, and these metropolises now operate in a 
network that cuts across national borders (see Paul Krugman’s work on the spatial inscription of 
international trade). What is more, most of these EU powerful urban regions are themselves 
concentrated in the North East of Europe, adding to their power (see map 2).  
 
 
Map 2. GDP per head (PPS), 2006 
 
 
Source: European Commission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a vast and robust literature on economic geography, a branch of which deals with national 
and regional convergence. Williamson (1965) has argued that economic development should be 
accompanied first by a widening of regional inequalities (as capital and skilled labor are accumulated 
in leading dynamic urban centers) but then by a reduction thereof due to redistribution policies and 
centrifugal forces (e.g. congestion costs). Yet, further work focused on the possibility that this 
second phase does not take place, as a spatially cumulative process takes over. As a result, disparities 
increase instead of being reduced.  
 
The effects of concentration and urbanisation linked to the success of the Single Market have put 
European cities, some of which clearly resemble the city states of the Middle-Age in Europe 
(especially in Italy and the Netherlands), back at the forefront of the economic and political scene. 
But the very strong regional disparities that result form this new power could threaten national unity 
in each of the EU countries. The greater geographical disparities will mean that areas close to each 
other in space will live in different times. The European Union appears, once again, as submitted to 
the consequence of the gap between economic integration and political governance. 
 
Actually, the EU presents itself in 2009 as a “little globalisation” where regional differences are 
greater than in other developed countries. According to Eurostat, GDP varies regionally much more 
than nationally (table 5): The gap is 1 for 3,5 nationally, but 6,3 regionally (from 40% to 253% of EU 
27 average) with 41 regions now exceeding the 125% of EU 27 average level: those regions are the 
future city-states of Europe (table 6). 
 
 
 Table 5. GDP per inhabitant in PPS, 2008, EU27 = 100  
 
Luxembourg  253 Greece  95
Ireland  140 Cyprus  95
Netherlands  135 Slovenia  90
Austria 123 Czech Republic 80
Sweden  121 Malta  76
Denmark  119 Portugal  75
United Kingdom 117 Slovakia 72
Finland  116 Estonia  67
Germany  116 Hungary  63
Belgium  115 Lithuania  61
France  107 Poland  57
Spain  104 Latvia  56
Italy  100 Romania  46
EU27  100 Bulgaria  40
 
 
London  198.8** 
 South East (England)  128.0 
 Scotland  115.9 
 East of England  113.6 
 South West (England)  110.4 
 East Midlands (England)  107.1 
 North West (England)  104.7 
 West Midlands (England) 103.6 
 Yorkshire & the Humber 102.4 
 Northern Ireland  97.7 
 North East (England)  95.1 
 Wales  90.4 
 
 
 
Source : Eurostat, authors’ calculations. 
*: without Luxembourg. 
** 2006 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bratislavský kraj  148.7** 
 Západné Slovensko 62.8 
 Stredné Slovensko 49.2 
 Východné Slovensko  44.0 
1 : 3,36
1 : 2,2 
EU 27   1 : 3,5*EU 15  1 : 1,86* 
Table 6. Regional GDP per inhabitant in the EU27 in 2006  
(in PPS, EU27 = 100)  
 
The twenty highest:  The twenty lowest:  
1  Inner London (UK)  336 1 Nord-Est (RO)  25
2  Luxembourg (LU)  267 2 Severozapaden (BG)  25
3  Bruxelles-Cap. / Brussels Hfdst. (BE)  233 3 Severen tsentralen (BG)  27
4  Hamburg (DE)  200 4 Yuzhen tsentralen (BG)  28
5  Groningen (NL)  174 5 Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO)  30
6  Île de France (FR)  170 6 Yugoiztochen (BG)  31
7  Oberbayern (DE)  168 7 Severoiztochen (BG)  32
8  Wien (AT)  166 8 Sud-Muntenia (RO)  32
9  Stockholm (SE)  166 9 Sud-Est (RO)  33
10  Berkshire, Buckinghamshire & Oxfordshire (UK)  164 10 Lubelskie (PL)  35
11  Southern & Eastern (IE)  163 11 Podkarpackie (PL)  36
12  Praha (CZ)  162 12 Nord-Vest (RO)  36
13  Darmstadt (DE)  158 13 Centru (RO)  38
14  Bremen (DE)  157 14 Podlaskie (PL)  38
15  Utrecht (NL)  156 15 Warmińsko-Mazurskie (PL) 40
16  Hovedstaden (DK)  155 16 Swietokrzyskie (PL)  40
17  North Eastern Scotland (UK)  153 17 Észak-Alföld (HU)  40
18  Noord-Holland (NL)  151 18 Észak-Magyarország (HU)  41
19  Bratislavský Kraj (SK)  149 19 Opolskie (PL)  42
20  Åland (FI)  147 20 Dél-Alföld (HU)  42
Source : Eurostat. 
 
 
Recent empirical research conducted by the regional Directory of the European Commission yet 
shows an overall reduction of disparities among EU regions. But on closer examination, this 
reduction is due to the fact that national convergence has taken place in the EU (catch-up has 
occurred for the former poorest member states). On the contrary, disparities among regions are 
increasing.  
 
The further decoupling of the wealthiest metropolises and regions from other areas will threaten the 
unity of certain European nation states (current examples are Italy and Belgium).  
 
Major resistance to redistribution between regions and cities could also emerge. In our “return of the 
City states” scenario, tax competition at European level will reduce the scope for Member States to 
levy taxes. On the other hand, cities are backed by local consent for tax, as local taxes are used to 
finance the provision of the city’s public goods and to increase its amenities and appeal. Regional 
authorities will more and more aspire to reinvesting the benefits of their growth in their own 
territory. They appear even more justified in doing so as opening-up to trade causes different regions 
to compete with each other to host businesses and, more generally, productive resources. The 
prospect of predatory cities skimming off (human, environmental, etc.) resources from their sphere 
of influence for their sole benefit represents an extension of the risk of growing divorce between 
metropolises and the areas surrounding them. Political decentralisation will be driven by the market. 
Major European cities will be colonized by the super-rich, nationals and foreigners, with the middle 
classes being relegated to the periphery owing to the cost of living. The city of London is currently 
the most advanced example of this dynamic. 
 
Separatist claims and demands for autonomy will also increase rapidly (current examples include 
those staked by the Northern League in Italy, nationalist parties in southern Tyrol, Scotland and 
Catalonia, as well as the plan to divide up Belgium into Wallonia and Flanders). These movements 
are generally based on the economic atrophy of other regions and on the social problems developing 
there, which is used to legitimise the prospect of separate development. 
 
This second scenario thus poses a major socio-political threat: the effects of concentration and 
desertification would not prevent the continued survival of a distant urban and mixed urban/rural 
periphery. They may lead to the displacement of impoverished populations that have become 
unstable and the development of an informal economy parallel to the richest regions. 
 
 
Third scenario: “Renascent Europe” 
  
 
In this third, more optimistic scenario, the European identity and political project are reborn through 
common efforts to achieve a comparative social and environmental advantage in globalisation 
combining social justice and sustainable development. In short, Europe is revived by social-ecology.  
 
The new political regime that sustains this ambition is the “Europe of public goods”. “Europe of 
public goods” aims first and foremost at restoring the purpose of European economic and political 
integration by reconciling two fundamental realities of the European project, i.e. the nation state and 
pooled sovereignty. In this pseudo-federal system, political debate focuses on “European public 
goods”, i.e. the goods likely to benefit all the European populations and not only one or other 
Member State, and on the means of producing and financing them. 
 
What public goods could be defined at European level? Macroeconomic stability, employment, 
territorial cohesion, advancement of knowledge and knowledge-sharing, environmental protection, 
both natural and human (underpinning the concept of sustainable development), mobility, energy 
independence are all European public goods. National cohesion through social integration within 
each Member State can also be understood as a European public good, because it affords the best 
protection against the risk of conflict across the continent and preserves the most precious of all 
European public goods: peace. 
 
These public goods would be produced from the alliance and cooperation between countries that 
have uniquely chosen to share their sovereignty in order to be fully themselves. The definition and 
provision of “European public goods”, i.e. the explicit presentation and reform of the political 
project promoting economic integration in Europe seem much more essential to the well-being of 
populations and the future of the European Union than scrupulous observation of the doctrines of 
monetary and fiscal stability, which, at best, merely set intermediate objectives and, at worst, prevent 
the ultimate objectives from being reached. To this extent, a definition of shared public goods at 
European level would pave the way for Europe to build itself into a large political and economic 
country. 
 
The scenario of a “Renascent Europe” relies on three ambitions: the building of economic 
sovereignty aimed at a proactive macroeconomic policy and safeguard of the diversity of national 
social compacts; a growth strategy focused on “productivity-competitiveness” (upward move in 
qualifications and innovations) and not “cost-competitiveness” (downward scramble in social 
models); environmental sustainability (low-carbon growth respectful of ecosystems).  
 
The development of “productivity-competitiveness” would rely on the coming together of Member 
States for a policy of cohesion-driven investments fostering higher levels of qualification and access 
to high-quality jobs. Fresh impetus would be achieved in social progress through the mobility of 
knowledge in Europe (students and apprentices) and the construction of a European labour force for 
the 21st century. 
 
The challenge of new environmental and energy technologies would provide an opportunity for a 
pragmatic deepening of the European political union: a “European community for the environment, 
energy and research” along the lines of the 1951 Coal and steel Community, with the aim of 
becoming the world leader in ecological comparative advantage thanks to its own budget and special 
tax framework. 
 
From an institutional point of view, the scenario of a “Renascent Europe” implies that the current 
European growth strategy, the Lisbon agenda, is abandoned, as its results are far behind ambitions 
and proclamations. While the objective of the Lisbon Strategy was to foster the transition to a 
knowledge-based economy by 2010, what we have witnessed is an actual drop in research spending 
in the EU (1.84% of GDP in 2006 compared with 3.3% in Japan and 2.1% in the United States). In 
fact, all of Lisbon goals are out of reach for 2010.  
 
Furthermore, this would entail some important reforms. Public investment in education/training and 
new environmental and energy technologies should be excluded from budget deficit calculations. It 
would be up to the Council of Europe to determine what it considers as belonging to this category of 
spending, i.e. to set priorities that the EU intends to pursue in terms of spending on the future and 
on “European public goods”. 
 
The EU should also allow for massive investments in European infrastructure, possibly through the 
issuance of euro-bonds. Since it contributes to the implementation and development of the internal 
market and to reinforcement of economic and social cohesion, the construction of the trans-
European transportation network is a public good. It represents a major factor contributing to 
economic competitiveness and to the balanced and lasting development of the European Union. 
Several projects considered crucial for developing European competitiveness and for ending the 
isolation of certain regions may still not see the light of day given the lack of sufficient funding. 
There is also a major environmental interest in completing those projects, as the transportation 
sector alone accounts for a quarter of total greenhouse gas emissions and these are growing rapidly 
(Table 7). 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Evolution of GHG emissions, 1990-2007 
 
 UE 15 UE 27 
   
Waste -38,9 -33,7 
 Manufacturing Industries and Construction-15,5 -21,6 
 Residential building -13,6 -17,6 
 Commercial/Institutional building -12,6 -18,1 
 Agriculture -11,3 -20,2 
 Industrial Processes -10,8 -9,9 
 Energy Industries 4,9 -4,4 
 Transports 23,7 26,0 
Road transports 24,6 28,7 
Source : EEA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A “European Community of the environment, energy and research” would also be created. The only 
success of the Lisbon agenda was accidental: in the last decade, the EU did not become the most 
competitive knowledge economy, but the first low-carbon developed economy in the world. The EU 
should build on this success and become the world centre for the production of clean energies. But 
this is true challenge that will not come without important reforms. The EU indeed has the best 
performance in greenhouse gas emissions reductions of all Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries, but its 
performance is not as good since 2000 (Table 8). More worrying, EU member states diverge sharply 
when it comes to meeting their respective targets of emissions reduction (chart 5).  
 
 
Table 8. GHGs excluding LULUCF, in Gg CO2 eq, in % change 
 
 Change 1990-2000 Change 1990-2006 
All Annex I -6,9 -4,7 
Annex I EIT parties -41,3 -37 
Annex I non-EIT parties + 8,8 + 9,9 
EU 15 -3 -2,2 
US +14,1 +14,4 
Japan +6 +5,3 
Australia +19 +28,8 
Canada + 21,2 + 21,7 
Source : UNFCCC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5. Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and Kyoto target for EU member states 
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Source : EEA. 
 
 
The “European Community of the environment, energy and research” would pursue three closely 
related objectives – energy independence and thus security for Europe, the preservation and 
improvement of terrestrial ecosystems and human development and finally what is now referred to 
as “green growth”. In this perspective, European taxation on carbon (both through the EU ETS and 
carbon taxes) should be reviewed, improved and reinvented. 
 
The European Union has the requisite scale to complete this project and its socio-cultural model is 
predicated on a dual preference for social justice and the environment. This elaboration and 
achievement of this institution would help to reinvent the European project itself, in the very same 
way the 1951 Community was the institutional laboratory for the Europe that emerged from the 
Treaties of Rome.  
 
